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REMARKS ON VIOLENCE AND PAYING THE PENALTY 
by 
KAI NIELSEN 
I 
l labor w1der the misfortune of almost entirely agreeing with what 
Professor Cohen has to say about civil disobedience in a constitutional 
democracy. To add to my discomfiture , the one place wh.ere I seriously 
question his argument. I accept and take to be of crucial importance the 
underlying point behind his argument. 
What I shall do in this circumstance is Clrst to bring out my one 
important disagreement with Professor Cohen and then very briefly dis­
cuss violence as a political tactic. The latter JS relevant to our deliber· 
ations here, for it is now felt by many that over such major issues as tile 
oppression of the blacks. the draft and the lndo-Chinese war the time for 
civil disobediBnce is past, that things have been escalated to such an 
extent and the perfidy and moral sloth of the American government is so 
great, that continued Cl'lil disobedience is of no avail. We are left, as 
we face Babylon, with the stArk alternatives of submission (perhaps 
accompanied oy what the Germans call imi.ere EmigrationJ, literal imi� 
gration or a resistance going beyond civil disobedience which may in· 
volve some forms of violence . It is terribly important and terribly difficult 
to try to ascertain whether this is our situation and whether over such 
large issues acts of civill disobedience are useless. These are also em­
barras�ing questions for a philosopher for they are not questions which 
can be resolved simply by using the tools of his trade, i.e. conceptual 
analysis, though conceptual analysis is relevant to their resolutio n .  
But they are weighty human and political issues , so let us see i f  we 
can make some headway with them. 
II 
I shall commence with the point where I have a disagreement with 
Marshall Cohen. Cohen remarks that .. After openly breaking the law. the 
traditional disobedient willingly pays the penalty.'' This might be taken 
in two ways . It might be taken simply as a description of what people who 
r�ard themselves as engaging in civil disobedience do. But then it is 
surely not the case that all people who engage in what they believe to be 
civil disobedience are willing to pay the penalty. Their public defiance 
of a law, they regard as so immoral that it requires disobedience. is 
sometimes followed by fonns of legal evasion. I think Cohen would reply 
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that in such a circumstance their acts are not properly characterizable, 
a5 'civil disobedience · .  And if rhis would be his reply, then his "After 
openly breaking the la.w, the traditional disobedient willingly pays the 
penalty" would take my second reading, namely it would be a state­
ment about the defining characteristics of what could count as ' legitimate 
civil disobedience'. That is to say. an act would not be a legitimate act 
of civil disobedience unless the obedient were willing to pay the penalty 
if the courts find against him. 
Cohen's claim - taken now in this second way - is too strong. What 
is a standard way, no doubt the most important way, of showing the dis­
obedient's fidelity to the law is not the only way. Moreover. there are 
cases. as I shall show below, that cannot be handled by Cohen's condi­
tion . 
First consider a s.ituation in which what the disobedient finds par­
ticularly objectionable about a law is the penalty for its violation. Sup­
pose the penalty for possessing marijuana was twenty years imprison­
ment. A disobedient might deliberately and openly violate the law, mak­
ing a political, moral 1>oint with his violation , and yet be quite unwilling 
to accept such a penalty. He could quite consistently with being a civil 
disobedient fight that penalty. His fighting such a penalty need not evi­
dence any betrayal of the community - though he woul(l need some alter­
native means to show llis fidelity to the law. But surely he could do this 
by willingly submitting to control of the courts rather than attempting to 
become a fugitive. He need not endure the very penalty he regards as 
thoroughly unjust. 1 
Moreover, there are situations in which the civil disobedient 11eed 
not knuckle i n  to the law where the law ' s  control of his behavior in a 
certain determinate wa.y flows from his act of civil disobedience. For 
this dark saying to become clear, consider this example. Suppose - say 
around 1950 - a doctor in a small town in the United States with a pre­
dominatly Catholic population announces that when it is medically feas­
ible he will perform free abortions to people seeking them. Let us further 
suppose that he actually does this and that the Catholic Church makes a 
great outcry against him. As a result of this outcry, he is ba1Ted from the 
two hospitals in town , his practice falls off and the like. But suppose he 
persists in performing abortions. until finally legal action is taken against 
him. If he then flees the country to evade imprisonment, after losing his 
fight in the courts, it is surely not the case that he has shown that he 
was insincere. that his acts contributed toward eroding the moral f ounda­
tions of civil disobedience, betrayed the community or exhibited contEmpt 
for the law. He surely in his behavior was showing high moral integrity. 
It was without a profit motive and could very well have been without any 
exhibitionistic intent. He had a moral point t:o make and he made it 
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throul!h his words and deeds and he had much to lose personally by 
persistifll?: in this behavior. Even in evading the law by fleemg the coun­
try. he has not shown contempt for the law or a lack of fide lity to the 
law if his evasions meet two conditions. First of all. they are all dertva­
tive from his attempting to evade imprisonment for his deliberate act of 
disobedience, which - but for the question of his evading punishment -
would have clearly counted as a civilly disobedient act. Second of all, 
they must be acts which do not violate anyone's rights in a serious way 
or cause greater misery or injustice all around, than would his submitting 
to punishment. 
More generally there are alternative ways for the civil disobedient to 
show his seriousness and the depth of his committment than by being 
willing to accept the punishment. Accepting the punishment is only one 
test among many for the disobedient's actually having acted out of con­
science in order to remind the public that in his judgment grave injus­
ttc�s are occurring and that conditions essential for humane social coop­
eration are not being honored. Being willing to pay the penalty is no 
doubt the mo:=:.t common test of the disobedient 's intent but it is not the 
only one . It is not a necessary condition for an act's being a genuine 
act of civil disobedience. 
Cohen's essay is admittedly indebted at several points to Ronald 
Dworkin's brilliant essay "Civil Disobedience The Case Against Prose­
cution" .2 Yet just at the very point we are presently discussing Cohen 
misses. I believe, an important insight in Dworkin's essay . When people 
challenge the draft laws, for example. and refuse to obey them in the 
public, principled and deliberate fashion of a civil disobedient, they 
are persuaded that the laws are often unconstitutional and in such a 
situation, Dworkin argue s.  their case about constitutionabty is a strong 
one. But then they do not regard themselves as having broken a law, for 
they believe oo reasonable grounds that the law they are disobeying is 
invalid, e.g. unconstitutional. and believing this they have no obligation 
at all m terms of fair play or anything else to accept the punishment. 
What Cohen fails to give sufficient attention lO in lhis context. 
though he generally does , is that there are cases and cases and situ­
ations and s ttuations and that civil disobedience will not come to the 
same thing in all circumstances. He is perfectly correct 111 maintaining 
tiia1 il is "e:spet:ially imponant" for a dvil di�obetlknt in a democratic 
society to accept the punishment for his civil disobedience. for . .  by 
accept ing the punishment prescribed by the law !he disobedient is able 
to emphasize commitment to law' ' .  He reinforces his claim about tile 
gravity and the urgency of the plea he makes tt:. his govemment and 
fellow citizens by his willingness to suffe r for his hellefs. Clearly this 
is an important malte1 . I t1ave only been concerned to show that lh1s is 
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oot the only way to exhibit a commitment to the rule of law or a deter­
mination to civilly fight corruption in the palace of justice. 
III 
I wouild now like to turn to the topic of violence and authority. An 
act of civil disobedience must be nonviotent at least in mtent. Gandhi 
and King argued for such limitations on religious grounds. but Rawls and 
Cohen give grounds for such a limitation which are independent of any 
religious commitment. 3 In engaging in civil disobedience. we are in the 
very nature of the case making appeals to the conscience of our f ella.v 
citizens and - in the typical case - to the men who run the government. 
We are trying to persuade intellectually and morally: we are not - and 
indeed cannot - since we are making a moral and politically educational 
appeal. seeking to change behavior and laws non-rationally through 
threats and by fear. Cohen's conclusion then seems to be the appropriate 
one: "There is a time for violence in human affairs, but when it arrives, 
civil disobedience is no longer an appropriate form of political activity." 
The question then becomes. when is the appropriate time for violence in 
human affairs? In what contexts is it justifiable. what ends may it legiti­
mately serve, what forms may it take and what limits must it observe for 
it to be justified violence? A lover of violence. a man indifferent to 
human suffering or injury, is scarcely human. Violence is indeed some­
thing which is in normal circumstances morally outrageous. It is infantile 
and immoral to romanticize it, but under certain circumstances it may be 
a grim moral and political necessity. What might those circumstances be? 
What I want to say about this is quite simple. It has been said thou­
sands of times before and it will be said thousands of times again. My 
excuse for repeating it is that it continually gets neglected in mucn of 
the current rather hysterical and/or romantic talk about violence. 
Consider first what violence is. To do violence to someone i s  to 
injure him. Violence is the infliction of injury or dam.age on some per­
son(s) or property and it is in itself always bad. But it is sometimes 
instrumentally valuable, i.e. worth doing, when. everything considered , 
the pain. suffering and injustice we overcome by engaging in violence 
outweighs the pain. suffering and injustice that results from allowing the 
conditions to remain which the violent action, and the violent action 
alone, could effecti vely overcome. 
There is, of course, great difficulty in ascertaining when these con­
ditions ootain. Many, who would accept this as an abstract princjple, 
feel that it is of very little practical value, for we have no way on such 
a vast scale of determining the relative amounts of suffering and injus-
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tice. At best we can act confidently with hindei�ht. Surely such ·a cal­
cttlus of historical possibilities' could never be anything like exact; the 
best we could reasonably hope for is some not implausible estimate cf 
the likely consequences. But some doubt that we can even attain that. 
No one in his right mind would deny that there is a problem here, 
but I think that it is an exaggeration to maintain that we can never make 
anything resembling plausible estimates here. As horrible as the French 
revolution and to a lesser degree the long English revolution were, they 
did bring about an improvement of conditions which would not otherwise 
have obtained . No good case has ever been made for the claim that the 
improved conditions would have, with less suffermg and misery, come 
about without the revolution. This may well have been true of the Ameri­
can revolution. but it is hardly true for such major transformations of the 
social order as are represented by French and English revolutions . 
To the objection that this is knowledge we can only gain with hind­
sight, from the long perspective of history, but could not have been 
known or reasonably believed at the time these revolutions were impend­
ing or occuring, the answer should be that there are recent revolutions, 
i.e. the Chinese. the Cuban or the Yugoslavian revolutions , of which it 
is far from clear that the violence necessary to make them and sustain 
them was not justified . '!'hey are , of course. engulfed in controversy and 
there is much to be said on all sides or this question, but we have some 
sense of the criteria to be used in making such a judgement and - t.o 
take an outstanding example - it is far from clear, American propaganda 
to the contrary notwithstanding, that the Cuban revolution was not justi­
fied and an advance , hardly otherwise obtainable, in freedom and social 
justice for the Cuban people .  
In asking whether in a given situation revolutionary violence is 
justified , we should consider whether it would bring about the kind of 
improvement in the quality of life characterized above to a degree which 
is not otherwise obtainable, and with what is oo balance the avoidance 
of greater evil and/or the achievement or a greater good than would other­
wise have obtained. In speaking of 'a greater good' here we are talking 
about the e1tension of freedom, the achievement of greater equality and 
justice and an increase in human happiness. 
What must be reiterated is that violence is intrinsically evil and can 
ooly be justified as something which is sometimes an instrumental good. 
(After all something can be intrinsically good and instrumentally bad. 
instrumentally good and intrinsically bad and the like. e.g. the stabbing 
pain one feels when one touches a hot object.) No more violence is justi­
fied than the violence m cessary to secure the revolution under the con­
ditions characterized above or, where the violence is not revolutionary 
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violence, to secure the desired social change where it, everything con­
sidered, would result in less misery and more happiness and justice all 
around. than would obtain if the employment of violence is rejected. 
It is often said that violence is never justified in a democrac y. But 
it seems to me that. exactly the same considerations apply here as apply 
generally. We only have to add, as another important consideration. the 
instrumental value of sticking with democratic procedures . This would 
make us ask tough questions about how well these procedures are func­
tioning or are likely to function in the future without resort to violence. 
We must also, of course. ask to what extent resort to violence will 
even furtLer undermine them and. what alternatives are a t  hand. But surely 
there is nothing intrinsically desirable about democracy such that we 
could reasonably make the general claim that violence is never justified 
in a democracy. It depends on the democracy and the conditions there. 
including whether it is only a democracy in name or whether it is a func­
tioning democracy. We must go case by case. Revolutionary violence in 
Sweden er Canada would be quite unjustified. Conditions exist there 
vmich make possible a peaceful and orderly transition to socialism. 
Rhodesia and the United States are something else again. Concerning 
these latter countries , besides the moral considerations discussed above , 
there are all kinds of hard practical questions to be asked. In the United 
States, for example, morality aside, the recent bombings and window 
breaking during demonstrations are plainly unjustified. There is no revo­
lutionary base at present in the United States from which to launch a 
revolutiai or a basic social transformation. This base must be built 
around working class people who have the potential power, numbers and 
organization to make such a transformation. But while there is a revo­
lutionary potential among working class people - half of the blue collar 
workers make less than ninety dollars a week - the workers have for the 
most part not attaine d class consciousness. A central role of students 
and other intelligentsia in such an activity is to develop - difficult as 
that indeed is - solidarity with workers and to help awaken class con­
sciousness in them and a recognition that a socialist transformation of 
society is in their own interests and in their own power.4 Questions of 
the legitimacy of viokence must al ways be seen against this background . 
Talk of violence along with 'Law and Order' ,  in the United States at 
least, is for the most part ideological talk. Powerful established inter­
ests and their Yes Men - their paid hirelings - among the intelligentsia 
decry violence instead of considering the circumstances in which it is 
not m order. Utilizing the emotive force of · violence · they by ideological 
legerdema in play on people's fears and moral sentiments - after all 
violence is intrinsically evil - and thus help make them antagonistic to 
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the Left. Irrational resort to violence by the neanderthal Left plays into 
the hands or such defenders of the status quo and produces m reaction­
ary forces much greater and even less justified fonns of violence . Such 
political behavior should nor drive a reasonable man into some absolute 
acceptance of the principles of non-violence . but should make him wary 
of ill-considered uses of violence and should drive him to a general con­
sideration of the conditions under which violence is justified. I have 
tried to contribute something toward the answer to that central question. 
What l have said is perhaps overly simple, but it seems to me at least a 
base from whicl1 we should start, and it very 01uch needs to be shown, 
amidst all the loose talk pro and con about violence , how it ts overly 
simple and where it needs to be modified, if it  iudeed is <>verly simple 
or needs to be modified. 
1 
• For the first e>e.ample and sorne of rhe c:onc:eptval points I am Indebted to an unpublished 
esuay by Sidney Gend in. 
2• Ronald Owork1n, "Civil Disobedience rj,e Case Acainst Prosec:uuon:· 1n Social Jus­
tice. How�rd Kiefer & Hilton Hul\1tz (eds.) (New York: I 970). 
3• John Rawls "lhe Justific:at10" of Clv1I D1sobed 1ence·· 1n Civil Oi1obed1enc:e: Theory 
and Practice. Huco Adam Beda,1 (ed.) (New York: 1969). pp. H l -255. 
"'· H lary Putnam has some Interesting and level-headed .:hincs ro say ab-0ut this. Hiiary 
Putnam "From' Re�1stance' to Student-Worker A l l i ance" 1n The New La-ft: A Collection 
of Essays, Priscilla Long (ed.} (Bonon: 1969), pp. 3 1 8-334, 
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